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OPINION2 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Although the jurors in Audrey McDaniels’ case initially miscommunicated to the 
trial judge that they were unable to return a verdict on the charge of third degree murder, 
they subsequently confirmed in open court that in fact they had unanimously found 
McDaniels not guilty of that charge.  The trial court then recorded a not guilty verdict.  
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania successfully appealed the trial court’s refusal to set 
aside the not guilty verdict.  Thereafter, the Commonwealth tried McDaniels a second 
time.  The second jury found McDaniels guilty of third degree murder, and she received a 
sentence of 15 to 30 years of imprisonment.  Eventually she filed a habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The District Court concluded that the retrial violated 
McDaniels’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of our Constitution and granted 
                                                 
2 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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relief.  The Commonwealth appealed.3  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 Brahim Dukes, an 18 year old with significant physical disabilities, died of 
starvation and dehydration in December of 2001.  At the time of his death, Brahim was in 
the custody of McDaniels, who was his stepmother.  This horrific crime resulted in the 
Commonwealth charging McDaniels with, inter alia, third degree murder and involuntary 
manslaughter.  The matter proceeded to trial, and on the first day of deliberations the jury 
advised the court that it was deadlocked on the charges.  Court adjourned for the day and 
the jury went home.   
 The following morning, the jury resumed its deliberations.  Later that afternoon, 
they again advised the court by a note that they were deadlocked.  The jury returned to 
the courtroom, and once they were seated in the jury box, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Court: For the record, the jury sent exhibit number four.  “Your Honor, we are 
hopelessly deadlocked at this time and unable to reach a verdict.” 
 Now, there were two separate charges in this case. 
 Who is the foreman or forelady? 
 Foreman, stand up please. 
 (Juror complies). 
 
Court: Was there an agreement on any of the two charges? 
 
Foreman:  Yes, Your Honor. 
                                                 
3 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a) and 1291. 
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Court: There was? 
 
Foreman:  Yes. 
 
Court:  What was the agreement? 
 
Foreman:  That we had an agreement on involuntary manslaughter -- 
 
Juror:  No. 
 
Foreman:  I mean third degree, I am sorry. 
 
Court: You agreed on third degree? 
 
Juror:  No.  
 
Foreman:  No, we did not agree, I am sorry. 
 
Court: You did not agree. And you did not agree on involuntary? 
 
Foreman:  We had -- some did agree on involuntary. 
 
Court: All right.  The point is, is there any possibility of a verdict in this case? 
 
Foreman:  At this point, Your Honor, I don’t think so. 
 
Court: Okay.  Well, I asked you before, and I will ask you again, if any further 
deliberations will prove fruitful I will send you back.  But if you don’t think so 
then we’ll just end it right here.  Does anybody on the jury think that further 
deliberations will be worthwhile? 
 No response. 
 
Court Crier: For the record, there is nothing on the verdict sheet. 
 
Court: All right.  Okay.  This case will have to be retried before another jury.  
That’s the problem. 
 As the foreman, you are telling me there is no hope for a decision in this case. 
 
Foreman:  No sir. 
 
A98-99. 
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 Despite the red flags raised by the foreman’s initial indication that there was an 
agreement and the immediate contradictions from another juror, the trial judge failed to 
step back and take the time necessary to “scrupulous[ly]” consider whether “manifest 
necessity” required the declaration of a mistrial.  United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 
(1971) (plurality opinion).  Instead of carefully examining the foreman and jury to 
“assure himself that the situation warrant[ed] action on his part foreclosing [McDaniels] 
from a potentially favorable judgment,” id. at 486, the trial judge simply declared a hung 
jury and discharged them.  He and counsel then proceeded to the jury room.   
 Upon entering the deliberation room, the trial judge was confronted with 
something remarkable: “On the blackboard each juror had voted, not guilty, right on 
down the line,” on the third degree murder charge.  A107.  According to the judge, after 
the jurors returned to the deliberation room they discussed the court’s questions 
concerning their ability to reach a verdict.  When the judge entered that room, the jury 
explained that it “did not fully understand what [he] was asking.  And that in fact, they all 
had agreed that it was not guilty as to third degree murder.  The only thing they could not 
agree on [was] whether or not it was involuntary manslaughter.”  A101.  McDaniels’ 
counsel then asked that the “jury be re-established into the jury box” and the court 
granted that request.  A101.   
 Having returned to the courtroom, the trial judge placed on the record what took 
place when he and counsel entered the jury room.  He then “ask[ed] the foreman to rise 
and announce to the Court what was the decision of the jury on third degree murder.”  
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A101.  The foreman replied: “Not guilty.”  Id.  The court inquired: “Did everybody agree 
to that [verdict]?”  A102.  “Everybody . . . said yes.”  Id.  The court posed a different 
question to the jurors in an effort to determine if any juror disagreed.  When there was no 
response indicating disagreement, the court declared that the “jury has unanimously said 
that it was not guilty as to third degree murder.” Id.  The judge then asked:  “And as to 
involuntary[,] could you agree?”  Id.  The foreman advised that “we had some that 
agreed” to the involuntary manslaughter charge and “[s]ome did not.”  Id.  The trial judge 
noted that the deadlock was on the involuntary manslaughter charge, and he then 
permitted the jurors to fill out the verdict slip.  McDaniels’ counsel requested that the 
judge “record that verdict officially as not guilty as to third degree.”  Id.  The trial judge 
agreed and announced the verdict of “[n]ot guilty of third and hopelessly deadlocked on 
involuntary.”  Id.  
 Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion to set aside the not guilty verdict.  
At a hearing on the motion, the trial judge stated that when he and counsel walked into 
the jury room, he saw “on the board there was a list of all the jurors and how they voted 
on third degree murder.  And each one of them voted[] not guilty.”  A107.  The judge 
denied the Commonwealth’s motion, stating that “once a person has been found not 
guilty by a jury, that person is not entitled to be retried a second time.”  A110.  In a 
subsequent written opinion, he explained that he acted to “prevent [McDaniels] from 
being tried a second time for a charge for which the jury intended her to be acquitted.  
Changing the jury’s verdict was necessary to prevent defendant from being placed in 
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double jeopardy as prohibited by the federal constitution.”  A436.  The judge further 
noted in his written opinion that he “did not attempt to influence the jurors in any way 
when he addressed them after the verdict was recorded, and was indeed surprised to see 
the marker-board that contained the jury’s unanimous votes for acquittal on the third-
degree murder charge.”  A437-38. 
 The Commonwealth appealed.  McDaniels’ brief in opposition did not explicitly 
invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Nonetheless, after a thorough factual recitation, 
counsel asserted that the “Commonwealth is seeking to overturn the verdict of not guilty 
on murder of the third degree.”  A505 (emphasis added).  Counsel argued that it would be 
a tragedy if McDaniels were to “be retried on third degree murder.”  A513. 
 The Pennsylvania Superior Court began its analysis of the appeal by stating:  “At 
first glance, it appears that the Commonwealth is appealing a verdict of acquittal, which 
is clearly impermissible.”  Commonwealth v. McDaniels, 886 A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2005).  The Superior Court, however, focused on the unusual procedural history of 
the case and declared that the trial “court had no authority to dismiss the deadlocked 
verdict on third degree murder once it was recorded and the jury dismissed.”  Id.  It 
determined that the not guilty verdict on third degree murder was “a legal nullity.”  Id.  
 On remand, a second trial followed in May of 2007.  That jury convicted 
McDaniels of third degree murder and acquitted her on the involuntary manslaughter 
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charge.  The trial court sentenced McDaniels to 15 to 30 years of imprisonment.4  
McDaniels’ subsequent direct appeal and her petition for post-conviction relief were 
unsuccessful.  This § 2254 petition followed, which asserts that the retrial following the 
not guilty verdict in the first trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  In a 
comprehensive opinion, District Judge Cynthia M. Rufe agreed and granted relief under § 
2254.  The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal. 
II. 
 The Commonwealth contends that McDaniels’ double jeopardy claim is 
procedurally defaulted and that we cannot reach its merits.  Our review of whether a 
habeas petitioner has fairly presented and exhausted a constitutional claim is plenary.  
Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 93 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 In determining whether McDaniels exhausted her double jeopardy claim, we start 
by recognizing that “the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or 
otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the 
Constitution.’”  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) 
(quoting Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).  “The underlying idea, one that 
                                                 
4 McDaniels served one year and eight months by the time the trial court denied the 
Commonwealth’s motion to set aside the not guilty verdict in the first trial.  Together 
with the years of imprisonment served since her May 2007 conviction, she has already 
served more than eleven years of her sentence.  It is worth noting that a conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the first degree subject to only a five year 
term of imprisonment.  See 18 Pa. Con. Stat. §§ 1104, 2504. 
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is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the 
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense . . . .”  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 
187 (1957).  The Court in Green declared that it “is one of the elemental principles of our 
criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal even 
though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.”  Id. at 188 (citing Ball, 163 U.S. at 
671).  In Benton v. Maryland, the Supreme Court “f[ou]nd that the double jeopardy 
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional 
heritage,” and it held that the prohibition applies “to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).   
 Whether McDaniels exhausted her double jeopardy claim requires consideration 
of whether Pennsylvania’s state courts were given “an initial opportunity to pass upon 
and correct” the alleged violation of this fundamental right against double jeopardy.  
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) (reiterating that state 
courts must be given “a fair opportunity to act” on a state prisoner’s claims (emphasis 
omitted)).  The doctrine of exhaustion “prevent[s] ‘unnecessary conflict between courts 
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.’”  Picard, 404 U.S. 
at 275 (quoting Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)).  Thus, the habeas petitioner 
must “present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal court.”  Id. at 
276.  While the claim must be “brought to the attention of the state courts,” a state 
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petitioner is not required to “cit[e] ‘book and verse on the federal constitution’” to satisfy 
the exhaustion requirement.  Id. at 278 (omitting citation).  Rather, Picard “simply h[e]ld 
that the substance of the federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented” to the state 
courts.  Id. (emphasis added); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) 
(concluding a state prisoner must “alert” the state court to the claim in her petition or 
brief and cannot rely on reference to the claim in a lower court opinion).   
 The record before us confirms that the issue of whether McDaniels could be 
retried in light of the not guilty verdict was entertained by the trial court when it 
considered the Commonwealth’s motion.  The trial court recognized the double jeopardy 
issue and denied the Commonwealth’s motion to set aside the not guilty verdict on the 
basis that “once a person has been found not guilty by a jury, that person is not entitled to 
be retried the second time.”  A110.  In its opinion denying the motion, the trial court 
explained that McDaniels could not be retried again or she would be “placed in double 
jeopardy, as prohibited by the federal constitution.”  A436. 
 McDaniels’ appellate brief, opposing the Commonwealth’s appeal to Superior 
Court, asserted that the trial court’s order should be affirmed because the 
“Commonwealth is seeking to overturn the verdict of not guilty on murder of the third 
degree and has asked this Honorable Court to review the same.”  A505 (emphasis added).  
As we explained above, when an appellant alleges the State is seeking to overturn a not 
guilty verdict, an appellant has explicated the sine qua non of a double jeopardy claim.  
See Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 (“Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the 
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history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could 
not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, 
and thereby violating the Constitution.’” (quoting Ball, 163 U.S. at 671)); see also Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The suggestion that a 
jury’s verdict of acquittal could be overturned and a defendant retried would run afoul of 
the Sixth Amendment jury-trial guarantee and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”).  Thus, even though McDaniels’ brief failed to cite chapter and verse of 
the Constitution or even to invoke the term “double jeopardy,”5 her statement that the 
State sought to overturn her not guilty verdict “brought [her double jeopardy claim] to the 
attention” of the Superior Court.  Picard, 404 U.S. at 277.  In short, there was no need for 
the Superior Court to read beyond McDaniels’ brief to glean her claim.  Her brief, which 
also contained a detailed factual description, “alert[ed]” the Superior Court to her double 
jeopardy claim, which challenged the Commonwealth’s attempt to overturn the not guilty 
verdict.  Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32.    
 The Superior Court understood the basis of McDaniels’ opposition to the 
Commonwealth’s appeal.  Indeed, as noted above, that court began its analysis by stating:  
“At first glance, it appears that the Commonwealth is appealing a verdict of acquittal, 
which is clearly impermissible.”  McDaniels, 886 A.2d at 686.  That, quite simply, is the 
stuff of which double jeopardy is made.   
                                                 
5 Not even the Fifth Amendment contains the phrase “double jeopardy.”  See U.S. Const. 
amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”).  
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 We conclude that McDaniels’ argument in her brief opposing the 
Commonwealth’s motion presented the Superior Court with the “substance of [her] 
federal habeas corpus claim.”  Picard, 404 U.S. at 278.  We also conclude that, 
inarticulately as it may have been framed, the claim McDaniels advanced was a claim of 
double jeopardy, and it has been exhausted.6  
 Because the Superior Court acknowledged that the foundation of McDaniels’ 
opposition to the Commonwealth appeal was the constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy, and because the Superior Court denied McDaniels the relief she was seeking, 
we may “presume[] that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits.”  Harrington 
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 
(2013) (concluding that the Richter presumption also applies when a state court decision 
addresses some issues, but does not expressly address the federal claim).  Accordingly, 
our review is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
III. 
 In United States v. Jorn, the Supreme Court declared that “a defendant is placed in 
                                                 
6 The Commonwealth (and the dissent) contend that a state court’s sua sponte 
consideration of a federal claim cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement.  Because we 
have concluded that McDaniels presented the substance of her claim to the state court, we 
need not resolve this issue.  Nonetheless, as we previously noted, the Supreme Court has 
“recognized exceptions to th[e] general rule” of exhaustion “‘where the State has actually 
passed upon the claim . . . .’”  Sharrieff v. Cathel, 574 F.3d 225, 228 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)); see also Jones v. Dretke, 375 
F.3d 352, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2004).  In such a situation, the state court has already had an 
opportunity to avoid any constitutional violation, and requiring re-presentation of a claim 
will not avoid “friction between the state and federal court systems.”  O’Sullivan, 526 
U.S. at 845.   
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jeopardy in a criminal proceeding once the defendant is put to trial before the trier of the 
facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.”  400 U.S. at 479 (citing Green, 355 U.S. at 
188).  “Acquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy.”  Justices of Bos. 
Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984).  In determining what constitutes an 
acquittal, the Court in Martin Linen instructed that the focus of the inquiry is whether 
there has been a “resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the 
offense charged.”  430 U.S. at 571.  That is, did the government prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt?  See id. at 572.  Was there a determination that the evidence was 
“legally insufficient to sustain a conviction”?  Id.  It is a question of whether, once 
jeopardy has attached, there has been a determination regarding the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 & n.11, 99-100 (1978).   
 Here, there can be no dispute.  Jeopardy attached once the jury was empaneled.  
Because the jury confirmed in court that it unanimously had determined McDaniels was 
not guilty of third degree murder, there was a substantive determination that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove its case.  Indeed, at oral argument before us, the 
Commonwealth acknowledged that it did “not dispute that [what occurred] meets the 
very broad and easily met definition of acquittal.”  See Oral Argument at 12:04 -12:13, 
McDaniels v. Warden Cambridge Springs SCI, No. 14-3485 (April 13, 2016).   
 The unconstitutionality of reviewing a verdict of acquittal had its genesis in  Ball 
v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).  There, three defendants were tried for murder.  
163 U.S. at 663.  Millard Ball was acquitted by a jury.  Id. at 664.  Millard Ball’s brother, 
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John Ball, and Robert Boutwell were found guilty.  John Ball and Boutwell successfully 
appealed, obtaining a reversal of their convictions on the basis that the indictment was 
fatally defective.  A new indictment was returned against all three defendants and they 
objected to their retrial on double jeopardy grounds.  Despite their objections, the second 
trial was held and the three men were convicted of murder.  They appealed. 
 Addressing Millard Ball’s appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out that he had been 
acquitted by the jury and that the insufficiency of the indictment did not factor into his 
freedom.  Id. at 670.  The Court declared that Millard Ball’s “acquittal by verdict of the 
jury could not be deprived of its legitimate effect.”  Id.  It then articulated the bedrock 
principle of double jeopardy jurisprudence, stating:  
As to the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict duly returned and 
received, the court could take no other action than to order his discharge.  The 
verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, 
without putting him twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.   
 
Id. at 671 (emphasis added). 
 The Supreme Court has steadfastly applied this rule from Ball, even where the 
acquittal was clearly erroneous.  For example, in Fong Foo v. United States, during the 
testimony of the government’s fourth witness, the trial court directed the jury to return 
verdicts of acquittal as to all defendants.  369 U.S. 141, 142 (1962) (per curiam).  The 
United States filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking vacatur of the judgments of 
acquittal, which the First Circuit granted.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  
Although Justice Clark dissented on the basis that the trial court lacked the “power” to 
direct the verdicts of acquittal in the midst of the government’s case in chief and that the 
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judgments were a “nullity,” id. at 144 (Clark, J., dissenting), the majority was not 
persuaded.  It followed Ball and determined that, even though the acquittals by the jury 
were based on an “egregiously erroneous foundation,” retrial was barred under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id. at 143.   
 In Smith v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court concluded that a midtrial Rule 29 
acquittal was a “substantive determination that the prosecution ha[d] failed to carry its 
burden” on one of the crimes charged.  543 U.S. 462, 468 (2005).  That ruling, though 
based on the court’s misapprehension of the government’s evidence in chief, barred 
retrial because it is “well-established . . . that the bar [to retrial] will attach to a preverdict 
acquittal that is patently wrong in law.”  Id. at 473.  As support for this declaration, the 
Supreme Court cited Martin Linen and Fong Foo, as well as other cases in which there 
was an erroneous acquittal that nonetheless served as a double jeopardy bar to future 
prosecution.  Id.; see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 n.7 (1986) 
(instructing that even if trial court’s dismissal of certain charges after the prosecution had 
rested its case was wrong, it would not alter the essential character of the ruling, which 
was that the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendants’ guilt and constituted an 
acquittal); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1978) (concluding that 
acquittal based on “erroneous evidentiary ruling,  which led to an acquittal for 
insufficient evidence,” barred further prosecution); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 
(1984) (concluding that sentencing court’s entry of judgment in favor of the defendant on 
the issue of life, even though it was based on a misconstruction of the statute, amounted 
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to an acquittal on the death penalty, which barred resentencing to death after the initial 
sentence of life was set aside).  In fact, the Supreme Court noted in Evans v. Michigan 
that its “cases have applied Fong Foo’s principle broadly.”  133 S. Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013).  
 In McDaniels, the Superior Court declared that Pennsylvania law does not allow a 
trial court to re-empanel a criminal jury that has been discharged.  886 A.2d at 688.  
Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court’s erroneous re-empanelment and the 
subsequent entry on the record of the not guilty verdict on the third degree murder charge 
constituted an acquittal that should have barred retrial.  Ball, 163 U.S. at 671; Fong Foo, 
369 U.S. at 143.  Thus, the Superior Court’s decision, which allowed McDaniels to be 
tried a second time on the third degree murder charge, resulted in a violation of 
McDaniels’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however.  We must also determine 
whether the Superior Court’s adjudication was “an unreasonable application of . . . 
clearly established Federal law . . . as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
 Our review of the Supreme Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence convinces us 
that, when the Pennsylvania Superior Court rendered its decision in 2005, it was well 
settled that even an erroneous acquittal will bar the government from retrying a 
defendant.  Ball, 163 U.S. at 671; see also Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571; Fong Foo, 369 
U.S. at 143.  Yet the Superior Court in this case focused solely on the procedural 
impropriety of re-empaneling the jury.  It did not mention Ball.  In other words, the 
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Superior Court failed to apply Ball’s “most fundamental rule” regarding the acquittal by 
the re-empaneled jury.  Given the bedrock nature of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the 
Supreme Court’s steadfast adherence to the principle enunciated long ago in Ball, we 
conclude that the Superior Court’s analysis was an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in Ball, Fong Foo, Martin 
Linen, and their progeny.  Ball held that an acquittal “could not be reviewed, on error or 
otherwise, without putting him twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.”  
163 U.S. at 671.  Although the Superior Court recognized the error at play, it did not 
apply the well-established  rule set out in Ball to the erroneous acquittal by the jury.  
 In an attempt to avoid the principle that an acquittal need not be error free, the 
Commonwealth argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to re-empanel the jury and 
enter a judgment of acquittal.  It relies on the Supreme Court’s observation in Ball that 
“[a]n acquittal before a court having no jurisdiction is, of course, like all the proceedings 
in the case, absolutely void, and therefore no bar to subsequent . . . trial in a court which 
has jurisdiction of the offense.”  163 U.S. at 669.  This exception to the Ball rule does not 
apply here.  That exception is generally applicable where the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction at the inception of the case, such as where a prosecution is brought in the 
wrong county. See, e.g., Daniel v. Warden, State Corr. Inst. at Huntingdon, 794 F.2d 880, 
883-84 (3d Cir. 1986).  But here there is no dispute that jurisdiction was proper at the 
case’s inception. Nor is there any question that the trial court retained jurisdiction over 
the case for post-trial proceedings. Because a mistrial had been declared, the case was far 
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from over. McDaniels remained in jeopardy.  Indeed, the Commonwealth implicitly 
recognized that the trial court still had jurisdiction over McDaniels’ case when it 
submitted the motion to set aside the not guilty verdict.  Thus, the state trial court retained 
jurisdiction. Even though it may have been procedurally erroneous as a matter of state 
law to reassemble the jury and record the not guilty verdict, under Ball and its progeny 
that verdict should have barred further prosecution on the third degree murder charge.7  
 Nor do the Supreme Court’s decisions in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 
(1975), and United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (per curiam), aid the 
                                                 
7 We are well aware of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 
1885, 1895 (2016), and its observation that under certain circumstances, a district court 
may exercise its “inherent power to recall a jury” and that this power might be “limited to 
civil cases only.”  The Court further noted that “[g]iven additional concerns in criminal 
cases, such as attachment of the double jeopardy bar, we do not address here whether it 
would be appropriate to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case.”  Id.  Dietz is not 
controlling.  We are not addressing whether the state court erred in concluding that the 
jury could not be recalled after it was discharged.  Rather, given the impropriety under 
state law of entering the jury’s not guilty verdict on the record, we are determining 
whether that erroneous acquittal barred retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 The dissent makes much of the type of error at issue in this case, positing that the 
trial court acted “ultra vires of state law.”  We need not resolve the issue, but nonetheless 
express skepticism about this conclusion.  We acknowledge that Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 59 A.2d 128, 129 (Pa. 1948), declared, in a case in which the initial verdict of 
not guilty on first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter was then altered to guilty 
on the manslaughter charge, that “[t]he established rule is that the verdict as recorded is 
the verdict of the jury and the latter shall not be permitted to impeach or to alter or amend 
it after their separation or discharge.”  But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently 
noted that the verdict might be altered “in ‘extremely exceptional cases’ . . . and even 
then ‘only unless to make the corrected verdict conform to the obvious intention of the 
jury[.]’”  Commonwealth. v. Dzvonick, 297 A.2d 912, 914 n.4 (Pa. 1972).  That would 
appear to support the trial court’s action here, even if -- as the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court concluded -- it was wrong.  Moreover, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s 
observation that “a jurisdictionally proper but substantively incorrect judicial decision is 
not ultra vires.”  City of Arlington, Tx. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013).  
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prosecution.  The Commonwealth asserts that these cases demonstrate that a court may 
preside over a criminal action and enter a dismissal of the charges without acquitting the 
defendant for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  This argument ignores that the 
district court in each of those cases dismissed the indictments before trial even 
commenced -- trials the government had every right to prosecute.  In Serfass, the 
Supreme Court pointed out that the dismissal occurred before jeopardy had attached.  420 
U.S. at 389.  Thus in Serfass, the district court had no “power to make any determination 
regarding the petitioner’s guilt or innocence” and the dismissal did not constitute an 
acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.8  Id.   
                                                 
8 The dissent relies upon Fong Foo, Martin Linen, Smith and Evans for the principle that 
there is “constitutional significance to whether the trial court was authorized under state 
law to enter the acquittal at the point it did.”  In the dissent’s view, it is only when the 
trial court has the power or the authority to enter a verdict that there can be a valid 
acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  We are not persuaded.   
 We agree with the dissent that we must first ask whether there “was, in fact, a 
judgment of acquittal.”  And we acknowledge that the procedural context and the 
authority of the trial court—or, as the dissent contends, the “power” of the court to act—
informs the determination of whether there was an acquittal barring reprosecution.  Both 
of these considerations inform whether jeopardy actually attached and the factfinder 
made a determination as to the defendant’s factual guilt or innocence.  See Scott, 437 
U.S. at 98-100.  But there is no question in this case that jeopardy attached, or that 
jurisdiction was proper, or that jeopardy terminated in a unanimous jury verdict of not 
guilty. That resolution falls squarely within the definition of acquittal for purposes of 
double-jeopardy jurisprudence, notwithstanding the procedural errors that led to the 
acquittal. See Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571.  The dissent has not identified a single case 
that has rejected a double-jeopardy claim under such circumstances. 
 Aside from cases where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, or cases where jeopardy 
never attached, the dissent’s distinction between “evidentiary” defects and defects in 
“power” proves to be illusory. For example, the dissent reads Fong Foo as “expressly” 
rejecting the argument that the district court “was without power to direct acquittals.” 
Dissent at 12. But nowhere did the Supreme Court hold, “expressly” or otherwise, that 
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 Likewise in Sanford, the jury was deadlocked and the district court declared a 
mistrial.  Prior to retrial, the district court dismissed the indictment.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that Serfass was controlling and that the order granting dismissal of Sanford’s 
indictment before the commencement of the retrial did not implicate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because no factual determination had been made of the defendant’s guilt.  429 
U.S. at 16.  The circumstances here are a far cry from an order dismissing an indictment 
without any resolution by a factfinder of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, see Scott, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the district court in fact had the power to direct an acquittal before the government 
concluded its case-in-chief, based on, inter alia, a perception of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Rather, any lack of “power” under the applicable procedural rules was 
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. It was enough in Fong Foo that the petitioners were 
“tried under a valid indictment,” the trial court “had jurisdiction over them and over the 
subject matter,” the trial judge directed a return of the verdicts of acquittal and jeopardy 
was “terminated with the entry of a final judgment of acquittal as to each petitioner.” 
Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143.  Thus, the critical point in Ball, Fong Foo, and others is that 
the proceedings resolved in flawed judgments of acquittal, but judgments of acquittal all 
the same.  That is the case here. 
 Smith further illustrates this point.  There the Supreme Court looked to the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure not to determine the trial judge’s “power” to 
take the action it did—but rather to confirm that the trial judge’s grant of a “motion for a 
required finding of not guilty” after the prosecution rested its case in chief was in fact an 
acquittal—i.e., an evaluation of the evidence and its sufficiency.  543 U.S. at 468-69.  
Because the trial court had concluded the prosecution failed to introduce “a scintilla of 
evidence” on an element of the offense, id. at 465, the Supreme Court determined there 
was an acquittal that barred further factfinding of the defendant’s guilt on that particular 
offense.  See also United States v. Sissoon, 399 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1970) (analyzing 
District Court’s action in granting the Rule 34 motion for arrest of judgment, focusing on 
District Court’s reliance upon the “evidence adduced at the trial,” and concluding that the 
arrest of judgment “was in fact an acquittal rendered by the District Court after the jury’s 
verdict of guilty” that could not be appealed by the government).   
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437 U.S. at 98-100,9 and therefore neither Serfass nor Sanford support the 
Commonwealth’s position.   
 In sum, we conclude that this case is governed by Ball and Fong Foo.  Although 
the re-empanelment of the jury and the entry on the docket of the not guilty verdict may 
have been error according to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, it remains that the re-
empaneled jury announced a unanimous verdict of acquittal of the third degree murder 
charge – the same verdict it had agreed upon in the sanctity of the jury room.  Under 
clearly established Supreme Court law, the government may not subject an accused to 
retrial after a “verdict of acquittal . . . on error or otherwise.”  Ball, 163 U.S. at 671; see 
also Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143; Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 570-71.  The Superior Court 
                                                 
9 In our view, it is also settled that an acquittal requires a factual determination of the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence by judge or jury.  Martin Linen acknowledged that it is not 
the label that is determinative of whether there is an acquittal, but whether what happened 
“actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of 
the offense charged.”  430 U.S. at 571.  Scott reinforced this by analyzing whether there 
had been a determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Scott, 437 U.S. at 98.  A 
few months before the Superior Court ruled on McDaniels’ case, the Supreme Court 
observed in Smith that the Martin Linen definition focusing on whether there had been a 
factual resolution had been “consistently used” in double jeopardy cases.  543 U.S. at 
468.  Here there is no dispute that there was a factual determination made by the jury.  
Yet the significance of this not guilty determination was unreasonably disregarded by the 
Superior Court.  Indeed, Evans, though issued after the Superior Court’s decision, 
confirms that the Supreme Court has been of the view that courts have understood for 
some time that Scott provided the applicable test.  133 S. Ct. at 1080 (“Scott has stood the 
test of time and we expect courts will continue to have little ‘difficulty in distinguishing 
between those rulings which relate to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence and 
those which serve other purposes.’” (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 98 n.11)). 
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did not take into account this fundamental rule.10  Given the bedrock principle articulated 
in Ball, it was objectively unreasonable not to apply this precedent and its progeny.11  
 We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
                                                 
10 The dissent implies that the state court’s decision was reasonable because two other 
state courts have held double jeopardy did not bar retrial in similar circumstances.  But 
those state court decisions obviously were not reached in the context of a federal habeas 
proceeding, and therefore did not address the issue we face today: whether those state 
court decisions involved an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s clearly 
established double jeopardy jurisprudence.  Furthermore, we note that one of those state 
court decisions was found unreasonable by a federal court and habeas relief was granted.  
See Davenport v. Richardson, No.14-1092, 2016 WL 299081 (W.D. La. Jan. 20, 2016), 
adopting No. 14-cv-1092, 2015 WL 9906262 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2015).  Notably, 
Louisiana did not appeal the District Court’s decision. 
 
11 Had the trial judge’s initial declaration of mistrial stood, there probably still would 
have been a solid foundation for challenging McDaniels’ retrial as a violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  That is because, in addition to preventing retrial following a 
verdict of acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant’s “valued 
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.”  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
667, 671-72 (1982) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Supreme Court 
has held that reprosecution following a mistrial may violate the defendant’s double 
jeopardy rights if the prosecution is unable to “shoulder the burden of justifying the 
mistrial” by showing that there was a “manifest necessity” for it.  Arizona v. Washington, 
434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); see also id. (describing the prosecution’s burden as “a heavy 
one”); United States v. Rivera, 384 F.3d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Where a District Court 
sua sponte declares a mistrial in haste, without carefully considering alternatives 
available to it, it cannot be said to be acting under a manifest necessity. . . . Any 
subsequent reprosecution under those circumstances is barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”).  The importance of the trial judge’s role in ensuring that “manifest necessity” 
compels a mistrial cannot be overstated.  See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485-86. 
 Here, because the trial judge sua sponte declared a mistrial without seeking input 
from either party, McDaniels had little opportunity to object.  Cf. id. at 487 (noting that 
“the trial judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that, had . . . the defendant [been 
disposed] to object to the discharge of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to 
do so”).  In any event, McDaniels’ double jeopardy claim was not premised on the trial 
judge’s initial declaration of mistrial. 
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McDaniels v. Warden Cambridge Springs SCI, 14-3485. 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
If this case indeed involved a retrial following a cognizable verdict of acquittal, I 
would agree with the Majority that we might have overcome Petitioner’s procedural 
default to correct a state court’s unreasonable application of “clearly established” 
Supreme Court double jeopardy law.  But that is not at all what happened here.  There 
were two and only two legally cognizable verdicts returned by Pennsylvania juries in this 
case on the count of third degree murder, and neither of them was an acquittal.  The first 
was a verdict of a mistrial, and the second, upon retrial, was a verdict of guilt.  And what 
transpired between these two valid and lawfully entered verdicts—a state trial judge 
indisputably acting ultra vires under state law by purporting to re-empanel a discharged 
jury, to conclude in the absence of any hearing that the discharged jurors had not been 
tainted by the intervening off-the-record communications with defense counsel and the 
judge, and to supersede the final, properly recorded verdict of mistrial with an “amended 
verdict” of acquittal—was no “verdict” at all.  Rather, as the Superior Court held on 
direct appeal when it set aside that “[i]llegal [v]erdict” and reinstated the third degree 
murder charge for retrial, the trial judge’s purported entry of an “acquittal” was nothing 
short of a “legal nullity” under controlling Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent.  
Commonwealth v. McDaniels, 886 A.2d 682, 686, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 59 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. 1948)).   
No wonder then that Petitioner did not raise in the state court and the Superior 
Court did not recognize or address any federal issue presented by this case, focusing 
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instead on Petitioner’s purely state law arguments concerning the trial court’s power to 
re-empanel a discharged jury and supersede its properly recorded verdict with a different 
verdict.  Concluding the trial court lacked that power and thus there had been no 
cognizable verdict of acquittal under state law, the Superior Court had neither reason nor 
opportunity to address the merits of any double jeopardy claim, let alone the unusual and 
nuanced one that Petitioner now presents for the first time in her habeas petition, i.e., 
under what circumstances, if ever, a purported “amended verdict” of acquittal that a trial 
court had no power under controlling state law to enter at that point in the proceeding 
nonetheless must be treated as a valid acquittal under federal law, barring retrial under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.   
Yet, even though Petitioner has conceded in this appeal that she did not fairly 
present her double jeopardy claim to the state courts, the Majority not only posits that she 
did, but proceeds to hold that the Superior Court’s failure to treat the ultra vires action of 
the trial court as a valid acquittal was an unreasonable application of “clearly established” 
federal double jeopardy law.  Maj. Op. at 18-24; see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 
98 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).  I respectfully dissent.   
As explained below, first, even if Petitioner’s claim was not procedurally barred, 
the Superior Court’s decision did not contravene any “clearly established” Supreme 
Court case law; on the contrary, it was entirely consistent with a long line of Supreme 
Court cases—most recently Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016)—that strongly 
indicate an “erroneous” verdict of acquittal will only be deemed operative for double 
jeopardy purposes so long as the trial court that entered it was authorized by its governing 
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rules or decisional law to do so at that point in the proceedings.  And second, principles 
of federalism, comity, and finality prevent us from reviewing Petitioner’s double 
jeopardy claim when it was not presented to the state courts, was not ruled on by the state 
courts, and fits no exception to the firm prohibition on federal review of procedurally 
defaulted claims.  After reviewing some points on background, I will address these issues 
in turn.  
I. 
Although the Majority has fairly summarized the factual and procedural history of 
this case, there are additional details that seem to me salient to understand why we should 
be reaching a different outcome.   
Petitioner Audrey McDaniels was charged with murder and involuntary 
manslaughter of Brahim Dukes, a non-verbal and severely disabled teenager who was left 
in her care for two weeks while his father, Petitioner’s boyfriend, was temporarily 
incarcerated for failure to pay traffic tickets.  Brahim’s soiled and emaciated body was 
found by paramedics on the floor of a bare, frigid room, which reeked of urine and feces 
and in which the boy apparently had been for some time.  Petitioner asserted the boy had 
had a temper tantrum and collapsed on the floor.  According to the autopsy report, 
however, Brahim was dead for several hours before Petitioner called 911, and his cause 
of death was protracted starvation and dehydration.   
At her first trial, the jury reported that it could not reach a verdict on either the 
third degree murder charge or the involuntary manslaughter charge.  The judge then 
engaged the foreman in an extended colloquy in which he sought to ascertain on the 
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record that the jurors had tried diligently to reach unanimity, in the end asking the 
foreman whether there was any possibility that through further deliberations the jury 
might reach a verdict, asking the entire jury whether “anybody on the jury think[s] that 
further deliberations would be worthwhile,” and again inquiring of the foreman whether 
“there is no hope for a decision in this case.”  The responses were uniformly negative.  At 
that point, consistent with Pennsylvania law, the trial judge declared the jury deadlocked, 
recorded the jury’s verdict of mistrial, and discharged the jury.   
The trial court then moved on to other proceedings, including a bail hearing and 
scheduling discussions with counsel regarding a date for Petitioner’s retrial.  
Subsequently, on the request of defense counsel, the trial judge accompanied counsel to 
the jury room to debrief any jurors that might remain.  There is no contemporaneous 
record of what occurred next.  From the trial court’s subsequent comments on the record, 
however, it appears that the judge and counsel entered the jury room and engaged in 
unspecified discussions about the case with the discharged jurors, who had not yet 
dispersed.  The judge and counsel then noticed markings on the blackboard suggesting 
the jurors had voted unanimously at some point in their deliberations for acquittal on the 
third degree murder charge.  The trial judge did not take testimony from counsel, court 
staff, or any of the jurors as to what transpired in their post-verdict exchange, but the trial 
judge’s later explanation of his actions reflects that, in response to whatever questions or 
comments were posed to them, one or more of the jurors said they had been confused by 
the jury instructions and mistakenly thought the verdicts on the two charges needed to be 
returned jointly.   
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The judge then took the highly unorthodox step—prohibited by Pennsylvania 
law—of re-empaneling the discharged jury, soliciting from the foreperson on the record 
that the jury was now returning a verdict of acquittal as to the third degree murder charge, 
and purporting to supersede that original verdict with an “amended verdict” of acquittal.  
A few days later the Commonwealth filed a “Motion to Set Aside Illegal Verdict,” App. 
80, which the trial judge denied, explaining that his “judicial intervention” had been 
required “to prevent [Petitioner] from being tried a second time for a charge for which the 
jury intended her to be acquitted [and] . . . to prevent [her] from being placed in double 
jeopardy.”  App. 436.   
The Commonwealth appealed the denial of its motion to the Superior Court, 
arguing on the basis of Pennsylvania rules and case law that there was no cognizable 
“amended verdict” because the trial court had no power to recall a jury after it had been 
discharged, to set aside the jury’s properly returned and finally recorded verdict of 
mistrial, or to enter an amended verdict of acquittal.  In response, Petitioner too relied on 
Pennsylvania state authorities1 and made arguments, limited to state law, concerning the 
trial court’s ability to recall the jury and “to correct a defective verdict,” asserting, for 
example, that “[a]lthough the trial judge said [the jurors] were discharged, in reality, they 
were not.”  App. 514, 517.  Petitioner styled these arguments as reasons that the “correct 
                                              
1 Petitioner cited exclusively to state cases, with the exception of one Fourth 
Circuit case on which she relied to argue that trial judges generally have power to re-
empanel juries.  See App. 516 (citing Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 
1926)).  That case neither involved an amended verdict nor any double jeopardy claim. 
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verdict” should not be set aside and made no reference to double jeopardy, no arguments 
based on double jeopardy, and no reference to that body of federal case law.   
As the Superior Court was presented with a purely state law question of the power 
of the trial court and was proceeding to resolve the question on that basis, it took pains at 
the outset of its opinion to make that clear, noting that “[a]t first glance, it appears that 
the Commonwealth is appealing a verdict of acquittal, which is clearly impermissible,” 
McDaniels, 886 A.2d at 686, but that, on closer inspection, that was not the case at all 
because, under longstanding Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, “a jury’s recorded 
verdict is inviolate,” id. at 686 (citing Johnson, 59 A.2d at 129), and “[o]nce the original 
verdict was recorded, and the jury was discharged,” the trial court’s “authority to alter 
that verdict ceased,” id. at 688 (citing Johnson, 59 A.2d at 131).  At that point, “neither 
the judge nor the jury had any power to change the verdict,” id. at 689, and the “amended 
verdict” under Pennsylvania law was thus a “legal nullity,” id. at 688.   
The Superior Court also noted its concern that the jury had been tainted, observing 
“here that either the judge or defense counsel approached the jurors regarding their 
inaccurate verdict after seeing the votes on the blackboard; the jurors did not approach 
the court staff about their mistake.”  Id. at 688.  Moreover, the court observed, “although 
the trial court and [defendant] indicate that the jurors were not exposed to any outside 
influences between the time they were discharged and the time they were reassembled in 
the courtroom, we have no record evidence of this, i.e., no testimony from any jurors 
themselves or the court staff,” and “it appears that some person, whether the trial judge or 
defense counsel, questioned the jurors about their verdict after seeing their recorded votes 
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on the marker board.”  Id.  Under these circumstances, the Superior Court concluded, 
“[w]e would be hard pressed to conclude that this ‘discussion’ did not constitute an 
outside influence.”  Id.  
On retrial, Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder and acquitted of 
involuntary manslaughter.  She then appealed, raising only state law claims pertaining to 
evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence.  When her direct 
appeal was not successful, she filed a pro se PCRA petition in the Court of Common 
Pleas in which she made a fleeting reference to double jeopardy without explaining the 
basis for any corresponding claim, but she dropped her appeal of the denial of that 
petition to the Superior Court.  Petitioner next turned to the federal courts and procured 
counsel, arguing for the first time that the Superior Court’s failure to treat the illegal 
verdict of acquittal as a valid verdict that barred retrial violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.   
The Magistrate Judge, after reviewing the procedural history, observed “[t]he 
record reveals that the issue of double jeopardy was not raised in the state court system” 
and Petitioner’s claim was thus unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.  Accordingly, 
the Magistrate recommended denial and dismissal of the habeas petition without the 
issuance of a certificate of appealability.  The District Court disagreed and held that 
Petitioner fairly apprised the Superior Court “of the nature of the double jeopardy claim” 
because “her assertion of her right not to be retried again crie[d] out that she claimed a 
double jeopardy violation.”  McDaniels v. Winstead, No. 11-5679, 2014 WL 2957460, at 
*7 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2014).   
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Proceeding to address the merits, the District Court characterized the issue, in 
contrast to the Superior Court, as whether a “trial judge’s error of state law” can “vitiate . 
. . double jeopardy protection,” id. at *10, that is, whether “the state-law ‘legal nullity’ 
was also a federal law nullity,” id. at *12, and like the Majority, the District Court 
perceived no distinction between Petitioner’s case and the line of Supreme Court cases 
that have held an “erroneous acquittal” operative for purposes of double jeopardy.  The 
District Court therefore concluded the Superior Court’s decision was contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established double jeopardy law.  Id. at *11-12. 
Using the same reasoning, my esteemed colleagues in the Majority will affirm.  
The effect of that holding—in view of the District Court’s determination that Petitioner’s 
conviction of third degree murder on retrial must be vacated, its conclusion that double 
jeopardy barred and will bar any retrial on the count of third degree murder, and the fact 
that the jury on retrial, having convicted Petitioner of third degree murder, had acquitted 
her on the involuntary manslaughter charge, id. at *14—is that Petitioner will be deemed 
“not guilty” of any criminal charge in connection with Brahim’s death and will be 
entitled to the unconditional issuance of the Great Writ.   
II. 
As the Majority engages the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition, I will start 
there, before addressing the procedural bar that I believe should have prevented us from 
ever going so far.   
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A. 
 Our standard of review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which instructs that we may not grant habeas relief to a 
petitioner unless, in relevant part, she is in custody pursuant to a decision that is “contrary 
to federal law then clearly established in the holdings of [the Supreme] Court,” or 
“involve[s] an unreasonable application of such law.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 100 (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In turn, “[a] state court decision is 
‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth’ in Supreme Court precedent, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that 
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless 
arrives at a result different from that reached by the Supreme Court.’”  Eley v. Erickson, 
712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 406 
(2000)). 
An “unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect 
application of federal law.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).  
We cannot grant habeas relief simply because “we conclude[] in [our] independent 
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 
erroneously or incorrectly.”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 411.  That is, the relevant state court 
decision must be more than wrong: it “must . . . be unreasonable.”  Id.  And as long as a 
“fairminded jurist[]” could agree with the state court’s decision, it is not unreasonable.  
Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  
Put another way, we may grant the Great Writ only “where there is no possibility 
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fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the 
Supreme] Court’s precedents.”  Id. at 102.  As the Supreme Court has advised, “[i]f 
[AEDPA’s] standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”  Id.  
B. 
Petitioner’s claim on federal habeas is that her retrial violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because the supposed “corrected verdict” entered by the trial court—although 
ultra vires and a “legal nullity” under state law—must be deemed operative as a matter of 
federal law.  And the Majority accepts this argument.  Notwithstanding the Majority’s 
acknowledgment that Pennsylvania law “does not allow a trial court to re-empanel a 
criminal jury that has been discharged,” Maj. Op. at 17, and that the entry of the re-
empaneled jury’s verdict of acquittal was an “impropriety under state law,” Maj. Op. at 
20 n.5, the Majority concludes “there can be no dispute” that the entry of that verdict 
“constituted an acquittal that should have barred retrial,” Maj. Op. at 14, 17, because (1) 
initial jeopardy attached; (2) the trial court retained general jurisdiction over the case 
even post-trial; and (3) the jury, in the Majority’s view, at some point made a factual 
determination of innocence.  Maj. Op. 14, 21 n.6, 23 n.7.  So long as those conditions are 
met, the Majority reasons, the entry of an “erroneous” verdict of acquittal bars retrial 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause—regardless of the nature of the error. 
 Facially appealing as it may be, the Majority’s reasoning comports with neither 
the facts of this case nor Supreme Court precedent.  As a threshold matter, that recitation 
of the conditions here ignores the central feature of this case: the intervening recording of 
a final verdict of mistrial and the discharge of the jury.  In that circumstance, the Supreme 
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Court has held, “the [Double Jeopardy] Clause does not prevent the Government from 
seeking to reprosecute” because “the second trial does not place the defendant in 
jeopardy ‘twice,’” and “the ‘interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity 
to convict those who have violated its laws’ justifies treating the jury’s inability to reach 
a verdict as a nonevent that does not bar retrial.”  Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 
118 (2009) (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)); see also United 
States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 16 (1976) (holding that double jeopardy did not bar retrial 
where “[t]he District Court’s dismissal of the indictment occurred several months after 
the first trial had ended in a mistrial, but before the retrial of respondents had begun” 
because as a result of the verdict of mistrial, “the Government had a right to prosecute 
and . . . the defendant was required to defend” (citing Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 
377 (1975)).   
Moreover, the Majority can assert “there is no dispute that there was a factual 
determination made by the jury,” Maj. Op. at 23 n.7, only by disregarding the record and 
substituting its judgment for that of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which reasonably 
concluded that—where the judge or defense counsel approached the jurors about their 
alleged “mistake,” not vice versa; the judge or defense counsel questioned the discharged 
jurors about their verdict off the record; and there was no testimony from the jurors 
themselves or from court staff about the “discussion” that took place—the court “would 
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be hard pressed to conclude that this ‘discussion’ did not constitute an outside influence.”  
McDaniels, 886 A.2d at 688.2   
More fundamentally, however, Supreme Court precedent does not support the 
proposition that an “erroneous verdict” of acquittal bars retrial where the entry of the 
                                              
2 The Majority is content to rely on the trial judge’s statement that he personally 
“did not attempt to influence the jurors in any way when he addressed them after the 
verdict was recorded.”  App. 437.  The trial judge’s individual intent is of little moment, 
however, especially when relayed in a later statement defending his own highly 
problematic handling of the situation, for that statement says nothing about what was 
actually said to the jury by defense counsel or the judge or the effect on the jury of 
whatever was discussed.  Absent testimony from counsel, court staff, or the jurors 
themselves as to what transpired, the Superior Court was reasonably concerned about the 
effect of those outside influences and the reliability of the purported “amended verdict.”  
Indeed, the serious risk of jury taint if discharged jurors are permitted later to reassemble 
and alter their verdict is the very reason Pennsylvania, like many jurisdictions, see infra 
Sec. II.C, maintains a rule that “the verdict as recorded is the verdict of the jury and the 
latter shall not be permitted to impeach or to alter or amend it after their separation or 
discharge,” Johnson, 59 A.2d at 129, nor may the verdict “be molded by the trial judge,” 
Commonwealth v. Dzvonick, 297 A.2d 912, 914 (Pa. 1972).  And while, as the Majority 
notes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has left open the possibility “that the verdict 
might be altered ‘in extremely exceptional cases and even then only unless to make the 
corrected verdict conform to the obvious intention of the jury,” Maj. Op. at 20 n.5 
(alterations omitted) (quoting Dzvonick, 297 A.2d at 914 n.4), that sentence continues 
with: “i.e., to conform to a verdict actually rendered, but informally or improperly stated 
in writing,” Dzvonick, 297 A.2d at 914 n.4, making clear, as do other Pennsylvania 
authorities, that the exception is limited to the correction of clerical errors, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 94 A.2d 743, 747-48 (Pa. 1953) (holding that the clerk’s 
incorrect announcement and recordation of the jury’s properly returned verdict could be 
corrected “to read exactly as the jury found”); Commonwealth v. Meyer, 82 A.2d 298, 
300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951) (“[C]lerical errors may be corrected by amendment even in a 
criminal case.”); see also Burton R. Laub, Pennsylvania Trial Guide: Civil and Criminal 
§ 244 at 415 (1959) (“[I]f the jury makes a return which, though not in proper form, 
adequately expresses its true findings, and the clerk records the verdict in another form, 
the mistake in the entry on the docket may properly be corrected to accord to the actual 
announcement made.”) (cited in Dzvonick, 297 A.2d at 914 n.4). 
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verdict itself is ultra vires,3 and it makes crystal clear, at a minimum, that such a 
proposition is not “clearly established.”  For the general principle that a “verdict of 
acquittal . . . on error or otherwise” is operative for double jeopardy purposes, the 
Majority relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 
(1896), in which the Court held that retrial following a verdict of acquittal was barred 
even though it was later determined that the indictment was defective, id. at 670-71; see 
Maj. Op. at 15.  But more specifically, the Majority relies on a series of Supreme Court 
cases, including Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam); 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570-76 (1977); Smith v. 
Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469-75 (2005); and Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 
1074-81 (2013), in which the Supreme Court held that the particular errors underlying 
those verdicts or judgments of acquittal did not affect their validity and, hence, those 
erroneous acquittals still triggered the double jeopardy bar.  From these cases, the 
Majority generalizes that any “erroneous” acquittal bars retrial, including what it 
                                              
3 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), which the Majority cites to 
support the notion that “a jurisdictionally proper but substantively incorrect judicial 
decision is not ultra vires,” id. at 1869; see Maj. Op. at 20 n.5, is inapposite to this case.  
There, in considering whether the FCC’s interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction 
was entitled deference, the Supreme Court contrasted the jurisdiction of agencies with 
that of the courts, observing that “[w]hether [a] court decided correctly is a question that 
has different consequences from the question whether it had the power to decide at all,” 
whereas because agencies’ “power to act and how they are to act” are both “prescribed by 
Congress, . . . . the question . . . is always whether the agency has gone beyond” its 
delegated authority.  Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868-69.  As far afield as this case is from 
the Supreme Court’s double jeopardy case law, it hardly bears mention.  I note, however, 
that the Court’s statement in context, reflecting that a decision a court has power to enter 
is not ultra vires even if substantively incorrect, is entirely consistent with this dissent. 
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characterizes as the “erroneous re-empanelment and the subsequent entry on the record of 
the not guilty verdict.”  Maj. Op. at 17.  
The fatal flaw in that reasoning is the failure to make the distinction that the 
Supreme Court does explicitly in these very cases.  That is, the Supreme Court expressly 
distinguishes between one kind of “error”—in which the trial court renders an acquittal 
based on an improper evidentiary ruling or merits determination—and a different kind of 
“error”—in which the trial court lacks the power to enter the verdict at all.  While the 
Supreme Court variously calls the latter a lack of “power,” e.g., Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 
1081; Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 142, or “authority,” Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 570, a review 
of its cases from Fong Foo to, most recently, Dietz, reflects that the Court—at least thus 
far—has treated an erroneous verdict of acquittal as nonetheless valid for purposes of 
double jeopardy only when it has fallen into the first category, namely, only where the 
Court has assured itself that the trial court had the power to enter the acquittal at that 
point in the proceeding.  That is, to the extent there was “clearly established” Supreme 
Court case law on this subject, that law, if anything, supports the Superior Court’s 
conclusion and the Commonwealth’s argument here that a purported superseding verdict 
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of acquittal that a trial court had no power to enter is a legal nullity, devoid of double 
jeopardy implications.4 
I begin with Fong Foo.  There, the district court, outraged that a federal prosecutor 
spoke with a Government witness during a break in his testimony and believing the 
Government’s witnesses to that point to be lacking in credibility, directed the jury to 
acquit the defendants in the middle of trial.  See In re United States, 286 F.2d 556, 558-
60 (1st Cir. 1961), rev’d by Fong Foo, 369 U.S. 141.  The First Circuit reversed based on 
its conclusion that district courts lacked power under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to enter a judgment of acquittal before a party had rested, so that, in its view, 
the district court’s directed verdict of acquittal “was not only plainly erroneous but 
beyond his jurisdiction.”  Id. at 560.  A majority of the Supreme Court reversed and held 
                                              
4  To the extent the Majority may be implying that the Commonwealth waived this 
argument, which forms the entirety of its appeal, by stating at oral argument that it did 
“not dispute that [what occurred] meets the very broad and easily met definition of 
acquittal,” Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting Oral Arg. 1:48-1:55), the oral argument transcript 
makes clear that it did no such thing.  In context, that excerpt was the Commonwealth’s 
response to the question whether what occurred here “was in fact a determination by 
those twelve jurors of not guilty on the charge of third degree murder, as a matter of 
fact?”  Oral Arg. 1:35-1:46.  Declining to concede that the jury had made a factual 
finding of innocence and characterizing the issue presented to this Court instead as one 
involving “the very broad and easily met definition of acquittal,” the Commonwealth 
immediately proceeded to argue, as it has throughout this appeal, that that “acquittal” was 
a legal nullity because the trial court “lacked jurisdiction” to enter it.  Oral Arg. 1:50-
1:59.  And to the extent the Majority takes issue with the Commonwealth’s references to 
the trial court’s lack of “jurisdiction,” Maj. Op. at 19, its concerns also are not well 
founded.  There is no question that the trial court retained general jurisdiction over the 
case through its handling of post-trial motions.  Instead, as the Commonwealth states 
explicitly in its briefing, it is using the term “jurisdiction” in the context of this case (as it 
does interchangeably with “authority” and “power”) to mean “jurisdiction over the type 
of relief sought—acquittal,” a remedy which the Commonwealth argues the trial court 
simply “lacked the authority” to enter.  Appellant’s Br. 51.   
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that, even if based on an “egregiously erroneous foundation,” the verdict of acquittal was 
operative, Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143, while Justice Clark in dissent adopted the First 
Circuit’s view and asserted that the district court’s lack of power to enter the verdict 
rendered the acquittal a “nullity,” id. at 144 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
The Majority reads these opinions together as holding that an acquittal is final for 
double jeopardy purposes even where a trial court lacked power to enter that verdict.  
Maj. Op. at 16.  On inspection, however, Fong Foo holds no such thing.   
Although Justice Clark in dissent, like the First Circuit, perceived the issue as 
relating to the power of state courts, Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 144-46 (Clark, J., dissenting), 
the Supreme Court majority did not, instead expressly rejecting the notion that the district 
court “was without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances disclosed by the 
record,” id. at 142, and holding that the trial “terminated with the entry of a final 
judgment of acquittal,” id. at 143, i.e., a judgment cognizable precisely because the 
district court had power to enter it.  The “egregiously erroneous foundation” to which the 
Court referred was the evidentiary one—the district court having based the acquittal on 
the prosecutor’s conversation with a witness and its view of the witnesses’ credibility—
and the Court’s holding was that, where the trial court did have power to enter the verdict 
of acquittal, an acquittal based on an erroneous ground was “[n]evertheless . . . final and 
could not be reviewed” under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id.   
Subsequent Supreme Court cases only reinforce the line between inaccurate or 
mistaken judgments of acquittal, which the Court has held still count as acquittals for 
double jeopardy purposes under Fong Foo and its progeny, and purported judgments of 
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acquittal that a trial court had no power to enter (for federal courts, under the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and their inherent powers, and for state courts, under their 
state rules of criminal procedure and state law), which the Court has at least strongly 
suggested would not count as acquittals at all.  More significantly for purposes of this 
habeas action, these cases make perfectly clear that there has been—and at the time the 
Superior Court ruled in Petitioner’s case there was—no “clearly established” Supreme 
Court precedent under which the states (which assuredly may define the boundaries of 
their own courts’ jurisdiction and power) were constitutionally required to treat as valid 
judgments of acquittal, actions of their state judges that were ultra vires to the judges’ 
power and therefore null and void under state law.   
In United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., for example, the Supreme Court 
considered the validity of a judgment of acquittal entered by a district court purportedly 
exercising its power under federal law.  430 U.S. at 565-76.  There, as here, the jury had 
deadlocked and the district court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury.  Id. at 565.  
The defendants timely filed motions for acquittal under the version of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 29(c) then in effect, which provided that “a motion for judgment of 
acquittal may be made . . . within 7 days after the jury is discharged (and) the court may 
enter judgment of acquittal,” id. at 566 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) (1977)), and the 
district court granted those motions.  In holding that this post-discharge judicial verdict of 
acquittal was operative to bar the Government’s appeal—and rejecting the Government’s 
argument that “(o)nce the district court declared a mistrial and dismissed the jury, any 
double jeopardy bar to a second trial dissolved,” id. at 572—the Supreme Court 
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emphasized that the federal judge was expressly authorized under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to act as he did, producing “valid judgments of acquittal . . . entered 
on the express authority of, and strictly in compliance with, Rule 29(c),” id. at 570 
(emphasis added).   
Likewise, Justice Stevens concluded his concurrence (which focused on what 
statutory appeals were authorized under the Criminal Appeals Act) by observing that, 
because Congress had not statutorily authorized the Government to appeal from a 
judgment of acquittal:  
[T]he only question presented is whether such a judgment 
was entered in this case.  The answer to that question, as the 
Court demonstrates, is perfectly clear.  By virtue of [Rule] 
29(c), the mistrial did not terminate the judge’s power to 
make a decision on the merits.  His ruling, in substance as 
well as form, was therefore an acquittal. 
 
Id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Sisson, 
399 U.S. 267, 277, 289-90 (1970) (holding that the district court’s order granting 
defendant’s “motion in arrest of judgment,” which functioned as a judgment of acquittal, 
triggered the double jeopardy bar specifically because “Rules 29(b) and (c) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . expressly allow a federal judge to acquit a criminal 
defendant after the jury ‘returns a verdict of guilty’”).  
 In cases involving the review of state court judgments, the Supreme Court has also 
strongly suggested that the validity of a purported verdict of acquittal depends on whether 
the judge had power to enter it.  In Smith v. Massachusetts, decided mere months before 
the Superior Court’s opinion in the instant case, the state court entered a midtrial finding 
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of not guilty as to one count for lack of evidence but later concluded the evidence was 
sufficient to submit that charge to the jury, which convicted.  543 U.S. at 465-66.  The 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction.  The “first question” the Court had to answer was 
“whether the judge’s initial ruling on petitioner’s motion was, in fact, a judgment of 
acquittal.”  Id. at 467.  As the Majority points out, the Court held that it was, even if that 
midtrial ruling was erroneous.  See Maj. Op. at 16-17.   
 But the Supreme Court expressly based that conclusion on the fact that 
Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a) “directs the trial judge to enter a finding 
of not guilty ‘if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction.’”  
Smith, 543 U.S. at 467 (quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(a)).  Regardless of whether 
Massachusetts would characterize the trial judge’s finding of “not guilty” as a legal or 
factual conclusion, the Court explained, for double jeopardy purposes “what matters is 
that, as the Massachusetts Rules authorize, the judge ‘evaluated the [Commonwealth’s] 
evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.’”  Id. at 
469 (emphasis added) (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 572).  The Court made even 
more clear that its assessment of the validity of the acquittal turned on whether the judge 
had power under state law to enter it by observing “that as a general matter state law may 
prescribe that a judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the State’s proof can 
be reconsidered,” id. at 470, but “Massachusetts had not adopted any such rule,” id. at 
471.  The necessary corollary, of course, is that if Massachusetts had opted to 
circumscribe the power of its state judges with a different rule, the trial judge’s midtrial 
“finding” of not guilty would not have triggered the double jeopardy bar.  
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 And Evans v. Michigan, although post-dating the Superior Court’s decision, made 
the same point even more starkly, 133 S. Ct. at 1074-81, and thus sheds light on what was 
then clearly established double jeopardy law.5  In that case, the state trial judge entered a 
midtrial directed verdict of acquittal, which it was authorized to do under Michigan law, 
but it did so erroneously, by requiring proof of an extra element for the charged offense.  
Id. at 1073-75.  This kind of error, the Supreme Court held, fell comfortably within 
“Fong Foo’s principle,” which it summarized as follows:  
[A]n acquittal precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an 
erroneous decision to exclude evidence; a mistaken 
understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a 
conviction; or a “misconstruction of the statute” defining the 
requirements to convict.  In all these circumstances, “the fact 
that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary 
rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal 
principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it 
does not alter its essential character.”   
 
Id. at 1074 (citations omitted).   
Notably absent from the Court’s survey of Fong Foo-type errors is the 
categorically different kind of error involved when a judge acts ultra vires by attempting 
to enter a verdict of acquittal at a point in the proceeding when it is disallowed under 
state law.  And that kind of “erroneous” acquittal, the Court indicated, would not operate 
as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.  Id. at 1081.  That is, in responding to the 
                                              
5 For the purposes of AEDPA, “clearly established law” includes the “holdings . . . 
of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision”—
here, the Superior Court’s decision.  See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) 
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412).  But subsequent cases are relevant insofar as they 
reflect what was then clearly established, “clarifying the law as . . . applied to the 
particular facts of that case.”  Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646, 655 (3d Cir. 2004); see 
also Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 3:29 (2016). 
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Government’s argument that the Court’s holding would allow defendants to reap the 
benefit of trial judges’ unreviewable errors, the Court explained:  
[S]overeigns are hardly powerless to prevent this sort of 
situation, as we observed in Smith.  Nothing obligates a 
jurisdiction to afford its trial courts the power to grant a 
midtrial acquittal, and at least two States disallow the 
practice. . . .  And for cases such as this . . . we see no reason 
why jurisdictions could not provide for mandatory 
continuances or expedited interlocutory appeals if they 
wished to prevent misguided acquittals from being entered.  
But having chosen to vest its courts with the power to grant 
midtrial acquittals, the State must bear the corresponding risk 
that some acquittals will be granted in error.   
 
Id. (citations omitted).  Again, in other words, the Court attached constitutional 
significance to whether the trial court was authorized under state law to enter the acquittal 
at the point it did. 
Despite the language and reasoning of Fong Foo, Martin Linen, Smith, and Evans, 
the Majority contends that “any lack of ‘power’ under the applicable procedural rules was 
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis,” and dismisses any “distinction between ‘evidentiary’ 
defects and defects in ‘power’” as “illusory.”  Maj. Op. 21 n.6.  But were the trial courts’ 
power and authority to enter those verdicts indeed irrelevant to the Supreme Court in 
assessing their validity, there would have been no reason for the Supreme Court to find 
“power” in Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 142, and in Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1081, “authority” in 
Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 570, and “authoriz[ation]” in Smith, 543 U.S. at 469.  Nor 
would there have been reason for the Court in Martin Linen to explain that the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized the district court to act as it did, producing “valid 
judgments of acquittal . . . entered on the express authority of, and strictly in compliance 
22 
 
with, Rule 29(c),” 430 U.S. at 570, or in Smith to highlight that “what matters is that, as 
the Massachusetts Rules authorize, the judge ‘evaluated the [Commonwealth’s] evidence 
and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction,” 543 U.S. at 469 
(emphasis added) (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 572).  And in Smith and Evans, the 
Court went out of its way to point out that states could choose to circumscribe the power 
of their judges to enter verdicts only at certain points in the trial process and to allow 
appeals from purported “acquittals” outside those parameters—implicitly acknowledging 
that such ultra vires acquittals would lack any legal force and would not trigger the 
double jeopardy bar.  Smith, 543 U.S. at 474; Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1081.  
In sum, only having determined in each case that the midtrial directed verdicts or 
judgments of acquittal were expressly authorized under the relevant state or federal rules 
did the Supreme Court deem them valid acquittals—notwithstanding other factual or 
legal errors that may have affected their accuracy pursuant to Fong Foo.  But more to the 
point on habeas review, the Court’s case law up to and including Evans confirms that the 
contrary proposition—that such ultra vires verdicts must be treated as valid acquittals for 
double jeopardy purposes—was not “clearly established” under federal law.  And in the 
absence of such clearly established law, we should be reversing, not affirming, the 
District Court’s grant of habeas relief in this case. 
Here, there is no question that the trial judge in Petitioner’s case exceeded his 
power under state law when he reconstituted the discharged jury and purported to enter a 
superseding verdict of acquittal in lieu of the jury’s original and properly entered verdict 
of mistrial.  As the Superior Court observed when it declined to give effect to those ultra 
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vires actions, Pennsylvania law for decades has expressly forbid a trial court from 
reconstituting a jury after discharge to amend its verdict.  McDaniels, 886 A.2d at 686-87 
(citing Johnson, 59 A.2d at 129 (holding that a jury cannot amend a verdict after being 
discharged)); see Dzvonick, 297 A.2d at 914 & n.4 (Pa. 1972) (holding that after a verdict 
has been recorded and a jury discharged, a court can “mold” a verdict “only in extremely 
exceptional cases . . . and even then only . . . to make the corrected verdict conform to the 
obvious intention of the jury, i.e., to conform to a verdict actually rendered, but 
informally or improperly stated in writing”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
For that reason, in an analysis that fair-minded jurists could view as entirely 
consistent with Fong Foo, Martin Linen, Smith, and Evans, the Superior Court concluded 
that “[o]nce the verdict was announced and recorded, and the jury was discharged, 
neither the judge nor the jury had any power to change the verdict,” McDaniels, 886 A.2d 
at 689; that the trial judge’s subsequent attempt to enter a superseding verdict of acquittal 
was a “legal nullity,” id. at 688; and, hence, that the Commonwealth was not “appealing a 
verdict of acquittal,” id. at 686, but rather was appealing the trial judge’s entry of an 
“[i]llegal [v]erdict,” id.—along the lines expressly contemplated in Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 
1081.  The Superior Court’s decision thus hardly seems an “incorrect application,” much 
less an “unreasonable application” of “clearly established federal law.”  Richter, 562 U.S. 
at 100-01 (emphasis omitted).   
And if there remained any doubt about that even after Evans, it was dispelled by 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dietz v. Bouldin.  In Dietz, the Court granted a 
writ of certiorari to resolve a Circuit split as to “whether and when a federal district court 
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has the authority to recall a jury after discharging it.”  136 S. Ct. at 1891.  Although the 
Court held that in civil cases, federal courts do have “carefully circumscribed” inherent 
power to recall a jury to correct a verdict, which they ought not exercise if there is “[a]ny 
suggestion of prejudice” as a result of taint or external influences on the jury, id. at 1893-
94, the Court explained that if a federal rule or statute had prohibited district courts from 
recalling juries and setting aside a validly recorded jury verdict, federal judges would not 
have the “power” to take those steps—at least in the civil context, id. at 1892-93.  As for 
the criminal context, the Court expressly observed it was not deciding “whether it would 
be appropriate to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case,” id. at 1895, citing 
specifically to Smith’s discussion of the double jeopardy bar and the ability of states to 
“protect themselves” by crafting procedural rules that define when a trial judge has power 
to enter a verdict or judgment of acquittal in the course of the proceeding, Smith, 543 
U.S. at 473-74.  Dietz left for another day when and whether a federal court has power to 
reconstitute a jury and to enter a corrected verdict that will be deemed operative in a 
criminal case; a fortiori, when and whether a state court must treat as operative in a 
criminal case a corrected verdict that the trial judge had no power under state law to enter 
was, before Dietz, and remains even today anything but “clearly established.” 
Yet the Majority asserts that Dietz is not controlling because “[w]e are not 
addressing whether the state court erred in concluding that the jury could not be recalled 
after it was discharged.  Rather, given the impropriety under state law of entering the 
jury’s not guilty verdict on the record, we are determining whether that erroneous 
acquittal barred retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”  Maj. Op. at 20 n.5.  In my 
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view, this unduly cabins the Court’s holding in Dietz: The Court was not deciding in the 
abstract whether federal judges have the power under federal law to recall a discharged 
jury and to set aside its previously entered verdict with a “corrected verdict”; it was 
deciding that question as a predicate for determining whether the purported “corrected” 
verdict entered in that case was a legal nullity so that the original verdict would stand or 
whether, instead, the corrected verdict would be deemed the operative verdict.  Dietz, 136 
S. Ct. at 1896.   
That was precisely the question before the Superior Court in this case and, after 
considering the very factors the Supreme Court later indicated in Dietz were appropriate 
to determine whether the superseding verdict of a recalled jury should be given effect—
including whether the trial court was acting “contrary to any express grant of or limitation 
on the [trial] court’s power,” id. at 1892, and whether such power should be 
circumscribed in any event due to concerns of “external influences that can taint a juror,” 
id. at 1893—the Superior Court concluded the purported superseding verdict of acquittal 
had no legal effect, McDaniels, 886 A.2d at 686-88.  Specifically, it reasoned that, under 
controlling state law, a judge’s “later reassembling [of] those who had constituted the 
jury” to enter an amended verdict after the jury’s verdict was properly recorded and the 
jury discharged, was a “nullity.”  Id. at 687 (citing Johnson, 59 A.2d at 131).  And it also 
opined that although the trial judge and Petitioner asserted that the jurors had not been 
exposed to outside influences between the time they were discharged and reassembled, 
“we have no record evidence of this” and “it appears that some person, whether the trial 
judge or defense counsel, questioned the jurors about their verdict after seeing their 
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recorded votes on the marker board”—a “discussion” the Superior Court reasonably 
considered to be “an outside influence.”  Id. at 688.   
The Superior Court anticipated the reasoning of the Supreme Court itself in Dietz 
by identifying the question of whether the trial judge had the power to recall the jury in 
Petitioner’s case as dispositive of the question whether the superseding verdict the trial 
judge purported to enter was legally cognizable.  Given the distinction the Supreme Court 
appears to have drawn in cases before Dietz between legal errors going to the accuracy of 
an acquittal and ultra vires action going to the validity of an acquittal, its holding in Dietz 
that the validity of a corrected civil verdict turned on the “power” of the trial court to 
recall the discharged jury, Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1893, and its express reservation for 
another day of the application of this rule in criminal cases, we simply cannot say the 
Superior Court’s decision was “an unreasonable application of clearly established 
[f]ederal law.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 786.   
For these reasons, I believe we are overstepping AEDPA’s carefully 
circumscribed review by affirming the grant of habeas relief in this case.  We cannot 
recharacterize the novel and complex question here as a simplistic one of whether a 
defendant can be retried following acquittal or whether a generic “erroneous” verdict of 
acquittal is nonetheless operative.  Rather, the relevant question is whether a state trial 
judge’s actions in recalling a discharged jury and purporting to supplant a final and 
properly recorded jury verdict of mistrial with a superseding verdict of acquittal—at a 
point in the proceeding when such actions were expressly disallowed by controlling state 
law—must nonetheless be deemed a valid acquittal, barring retrial under the Double 
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Jeopardy Clause.  And the Supreme Court’s carefully crafted decisions in Fong Foo, 
Martin Linen, Smith, Evans, and now Dietz reflect that the answer to that question was 
not “clearly established” at the relevant time.  I do not begrudge the Majority that these 
cases are susceptible to other reasonable interpretations on which fairminded jurists can 
disagree.  But on habeas review, relief must be denied unless “there is no possibility 
fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with the 
[Supreme] Court’s precedents.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.  That threshold is not met here, 
and for that reason if we reached Petitioner’s claim, I would reverse.    
C. 
My dissent as to the Majority’s analysis and disposition on the merits is prompted 
not only by the deferential standard of review imposed by AEDPA and the federalism 
and comity concerns that underlie it, but also by the broad implications of the Majority’s 
reasoning for state laws currently in effect and for the practice of criminal law generally.   
Just as many states have prescribed when midtrial acquittals may be entered by 
their state courts, see Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1081; Smith, 543 U.S. at 474, many states in 
addition to Pennsylvania have prescribed when a court may reconstitute a jury after 
discharge to correct or amend a verdict.  In some states it is forbidden,6 and in some it 
depends on whether the court lost control over the jurors such that they had the 
                                              
 6 See, e.g., T.D.M. v. State (Ex Parte T.D.M.), 117 So.3d 933, 941 (Ala. 2011) (per 
curiam), Spears v. Mills, 69 S.W.3d 407, 413 (Ark. 2002); West v. State, 92 N.E.2d 852, 
855 (Ind. 1950); State v. Hurd, 8 A.3d 651, 662 (Me. 2010); Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 
472, 474 (1842) (en banc); Ware v. Graham, 417 P.2d 936, 939 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966); 
Yonker v. Grimm, 133 S.E. 695, 697-98 (W. Va. 1926). 
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opportunity to be exposed, or were actually exposed, to an outside influence.7  Moreover, 
at least two state supreme courts have held that double jeopardy does not bar retrial in 
circumstances similar to those here.8  States institute these rules for good reason. “Freed 
from the crucible of the jury’s group decisionmaking enterprise, discharged jurors may 
begin to forget key facts, arguments, or instructions.”  Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1894.  
Moreover, “they are more likely to be exposed to potentially prejudicial sources of 
information or discuss the case with others,” id., including the attorneys and judge in the 
case—and such exposure may happen immediately. 
                                              
 7 See, e.g., People v. Hendricks, 737 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Cal. 1987) (en banc); 
Montanez v. People, 966 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Colo. 1998) (en banc); State v. Colon, 864 
A.2d 666, 775 (Conn. 2004); Lahaina Fashions, Inc. v. Bank of Hawai‘i, 319 P.3d 356, 
368 (Haw. 2014); State v. Fornea, 140 So.2d 381, 383 (La. 1962); Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 323 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Mass. 1975); Anderson v. State, 95 So.2d 465, 467-68 
(Miss. 1957); Pumphrey v. Empire Lath & Plaster, 135 P.3d 797, 804 (Mont. 2006); 
Sierra Foods v. Williams, 816 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1991) (per curiam); Sierra Foods v. 
Williams, 816 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Rodriguez, 134 P.3d 737, 
741 (N.M. 2006); Newport Fisherman’s Supply Co. v. Derecktor, 569 A.2d 1051, 1053 
(R.I. 1990); State v. Myers, 459 S.E.2d 304, 305 (S.C. 1995); Webber v. State, 652 
S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc); Melton v. Commonwealth, 111 S.E. 
291, 294 (Va. 1922). 
 
 8 See People v. Carbajal, 298 P.3d 835, 840 (Cal. 2013) (holding that double 
jeopardy did not bar retrial where the court entered a not guilty verdict on a charge for 
which it “had no authority to consider” and for which “no valid verdict could have been 
rendered”); State v. Davenport, 147 So. 3d 137, 150 (La. 2014) (holding that a judgment 
of acquittal erroneously entered in the midst of a jury trial under a statute applicable only 
in bench trials did not bar retrial); but cf. Davenport v. Richardson, No.14-cv-1092, 2016 
WL 285060 (W.D. La. Jan. 20, 2016) (applying de novo review to a § 2241 petition and 
granting habeas relief on the ground that, although the trial judge had entered the 
acquittal in that case based on the wrong statute, there was no state authority prohibiting 
the trial judge from entering a midtrial acquittal and the trial judge in fact “had the 
authority to order an acquittal based on the original jurisdiction granted to him by the 
Louisiana Constitution”).   
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 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put it in Johnson, the case on which the 
Superior Court in this case expressly relied:   
[A] consideration of the evil consequences [that] would 
follow permitting a jury to reassemble and alter its verdict on 
the ground of mistake, should in itself deter courts from 
sanctioning such practice.  If this practice were judicially 
sanctioned, a jury might acquit a defendant of a crime and 
then a day, a week or a month later reassemble and declare 
that the verdict was a mistake, that they intended to find the 
defendant guilty and would then proceed to do so.  To permit 
such a disorderly practice in the administration of justice is 
unthinkable.  It is the antithesis of due process of law. 
 
Johnson, 59 A.2d at 131.   
 The Majority’s approach does not accord with these concerns.  Instead, it 
encourages state courts to re-empanel discharged juries where subsequent debriefing 
ostensibly reveals that, for example, one or more jurors misunderstood the jury 
instructions and would have acquitted.  The longstanding rule that jurors are presumed to 
follow their instructions as given, which rarely permits second-guessing the jury’s 
performance after the fact, was intended to safeguard the propriety and finality of verdicts 
and to avoid this very result.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987); 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 614 A.2d 663, 672 (Pa. 1992); see also Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) 
(“During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . , a juror may not testify about any 
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations . . . or any juror’s 
mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.”); Pa. R. Evid. 606(b) (same); 
Karl v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 74 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that Federal Rule 
30 
 
of Evidence 606 allows juror testimony about a “clerical error” in recording the verdict 
but not about “the jury’s understanding of the court’s instructions”). 
 What’s more, if a jury not only can, but as a matter of double jeopardy law must, 
be re-empaneled after it renders its verdict (or declares that it cannot reach one) whenever 
the jurors allegedly misunderstood the jury instructions and later assert that, with a better 
understanding of those instructions, they would have voted to acquit, the work of the 
defendant’s trial counsel must carry on well beyond the jury’s discharge.  For if the 
Majority’s rationale is correct, trial counsel who forego the opportunity post-trial to 
explore any misunderstanding the jurors may have had concerning the jury instructions or 
any possibility that the verdict, although accurately reflecting what the jurors reported in 
open court, did not reflect their true intentions, do so at their peril—inviting habeas 
claims based not only on the ground that the jury’s properly recorded verdict was 
incorrect and should have been “amended,” but also that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate this possibility. 
III. 
Notwithstanding the above-referenced reasons to reverse on the merits, I also 
dissent because we should not be reaching those merits.  As Petitioner’s counsel candidly 
conceded at oral argument, Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim “wasn’t specifically 
presented, it’s clear.”  Oral Arg. 30:00-30:08.  And for that reason, Petitioner did not 
even attempt in her briefing before this Court to argue that the claim had been raised, 
instead seeking to excuse her admitted procedural default on two specific grounds.  Yet, 
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over Petitioner’s own denial, the Majority contends that Petitioner did fairly present her 
claim to the state court.  I respectfully disagree. 
To “fairly present[]” a claim to the state courts, a habeas petitioner “must present a 
federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them 
on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.”  Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 328 
(3d Cir. 2014) (alteration in original).  A petitioner does not satisfy the fair presentation 
requirement merely by “present[ing] all the facts” to a state court, Picard v. Connor, 404 
U.S. 270, 277 (1971); see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996), even when 
those facts evince a “clear violation[]” of the petitioner’s constitutional rights, Duckworth 
v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (per curiam).  The Supreme Court has admonished that 
we must “adhere[] to this federal policy, for ‘it would be unseemly in our dual system of 
government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an 
opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,’” Picard, 404 U.S. at 
275 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)), and further, that “[f]ederal 
courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a 
prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state court proceedings,” Brown v. 
Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 
170, 186 (2011)).  We are called upon to safeguard this principle “[a]s a matter of comity 
and federalism,” Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 611 (3d Cir. 2011), and 
“[o]ut of respect for the finality of state-court judgments,” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 
522 (2006).  
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The record in this case demonstrates Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim was not 
fairly presented to the state courts and therefore, absent some basis to overcome her 
default, is procedurally barred.  On direct appeal to the Superior Court, the 
Commonwealth argued that the trial court had no authority to re-empanel the jury and 
enter the acquittal, and because that verdict was a legal nullity, the trial court’s original 
declaration of a mistrial must stand.  And the only arguments raised by Petitioner in 
response were that the second verdict was not tainted so that the trial court properly 
exercised its “discretionary power to insure the fairness of the proceedings” in the 
“interest of justice,” App. 511 (quoting Commonwealth v. Powell, 590 A.2d 1240, 1243 
(Pa. 1991)), and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because it was 
not a final or collateral order under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
Petitioner did not so much as mention the trial court’s passing reference to double 
jeopardy in its decision denying the Commonwealth’s Motion to Set Aside Illegal 
Verdict, and the Superior Court did not address double jeopardy concerns in its decision, 
instead reversing the trial court and remanding for retrial on the ground that the trial 
court, under Johnson, 59 A.2d at 131, “had no authority to dismiss the deadlocked verdict 
on third degree murder once it was recorded and the jury dismissed,”  McDaniels, 886 
A.2d at 686-87.   
Similarly, when Petitioner appealed her conviction of third degree murder 
following retrial, she raised only state law evidentiary and trial error claims.  And while 
she listed “[d]ouble [j]eopardy clause” among the four claims she intended to pursue in 
her subsequent pro se PCRA petition, Petitioner failed to complete her appeal to the 
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Superior Court after that petition was denied.  Given this procedural history, the state 
courts here did not have “a fair opportunity to consider the [double jeopardy] claim and 
to correct that asserted constitutional defect in [Petitioner’s] conviction,” Picard, 404 
U.S. at 276, and it was for good reason that Petitioner opted on federal habeas to concede 
that her double jeopardy claim had not been fairly presented and instead to dedicate her 
efforts to overcoming the procedural bar.   
Neither of the two grounds on which the Majority relies support its conclusion that 
Petitioner’s claim was fairly presented.  First, the Majority maintains it was sufficient for 
Petitioner, in the context of opposing the Commonwealth’s appeal to the Superior Court, 
to note that the “Commonwealth is seeking to overturn the verdict of not guilty on 
murder of the third degree and has asked this Honorable Court to review the same.”  Maj. 
Op. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting App. 505).  But that remark in the fact section of 
Petitioner’s brief was simply recharacterizing the “[i]llegal [v]erdict” the Government 
sought to set aside and does not come close to fairly raising for the Superior Court the 
question whether a verdict that is ultra vires and a “legal nullity” under state law must be 
recognized as a valid verdict as a matter of federal double jeopardy law, or, more 
precisely, whether an error in the very power of the court to enter that verdict equates 
with the evidentiary and merits-based errors that the Supreme Court held did not vitiate 
the verdicts in Ball, Fong Foo, and their progeny.  Instead, this excerpt is nothing more 
than an accurate statement of the procedural posture of the case—a statement of fact 
devoid of any legal substance and insufficient to constitute exhaustion, Picard, 404 U.S. 
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at 277, particularly where, as here, the facts do not evince a “clear violation” of 
constitutional rights, Serrano, 454 U.S. at 4.   
Second, the Majority suggests that when the Superior Court mentioned at the 
outset of its opinion that this case did not raise any concern that the Commonwealth was 
“appealing a verdict of acquittal, which [would be] clearly impermissible,” McDaniels, 
886 A.2d at 686, it was acknowledging that this case did raise that concern and that 
Petitioner had presented that concern in the form of a federal double jeopardy claim 
based on Fong Foo’s “erroneous acquittal” doctrine, Maj. Op. at 12.  I find that logic 
perplexing.  By remarking that it might appear “at first glance” that the Commonwealth 
was appealing an acquittal and then explaining that the Commonwealth was actually 
appealing an ultra vires verdict that had no legal force under Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court precedent, the Superior Court made clear that it believed itself presented with only 
a question of state law and that its resolution of that state law question obviated any need 
to consider whether the Commonwealth was “appealing a verdict of acquittal.”  
McDaniels, 886 A.2d at 686.  To turn that statement on its head and contend, as the 
Majority does, that it demonstrates the state court had fair notice of, considered, and 
actually decided the complex double jeopardy question Petitioner now seeks to raise, 
steps far outside of our role and gives short shrift to the fundamental principles of 
federalism and comity that undergird the exhaustion requirement.  See Lawrence v. 
Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 341 (2007).   
Because it espouses an exhaustion argument that was not raised by Petitioner, the 
Majority does not reach the two arguments Petitioner did raise, namely that (1) it would 
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be sufficient for the Superior Court to rule on the merits of her double jeopardy claim sua 
sponte and that it had in fact done so,9 and (2) there was cause and prejudice for her 
failure to exhaust her claim because her attorneys did not raise the argument in state 
court.  The first lacks merit because the Superior Court never proceeded beyond its 
conclusion under state law that there was no legally cognizable acquittal.  And as to the 
second, while ineffective assistance of counsel can be “cause” excusing a petitioner’s 
failure to exhaust her claims, Petitioner did not argue to the District Court that her state 
trial or appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to pursue a double jeopardy 
argument, see, e.g., Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013), or that her PCRA 
counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claim resting on the omitted double jeopardy argument, see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 
1309, 1315 (2012).  Any such arguments are hence waived.  See, e.g., Lomando v. United 
States, 667 F.3d 363, 381 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011).   
                                              
9 The Majority observes that even if it had determined that Petitioner did not raise 
a double jeopardy claim, it likely would have concluded that the Superior Court’s sua 
sponte consideration of the issue would satisfy the exhaustion requirement.  See Maj. Op. 
at 13 n.4.  Although a state court’s sua sponte consideration of an argument not actually 
raised by a petitioner may well satisfy the interests of comity and federalism underlying 
the procedural default bar and thus may be sufficient to constitute exhaustion, the 
Supreme Court has not yet adopted this rule.  While it said in Castille v. Peoples, that 
“[i]t is reasonable to infer an exception [to the exhaustion requirement] where the State 
has actually passed upon the claim,” the claim in that case was presented belatedly to the 
state courts.  489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989).  To date, our Circuit has not adopted this rule 
either, see Sharrieff v. Cathel, 574 F.3d 225, 228 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting in dictum that 
the Supreme Court raised the possibility in Castille of this exception to the exhaustion 
requirement), although some Circuits have, see, e.g., Jones v. Dretke, 375 F.3d 352, 355 
(5th Cir. 2004); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Walton v. 
Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356 (8th Cir. 1990); Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 
1206 (11th Cir. 1984).  The exception, in any event, is inapplicable here as the Superior 
Court did not address any double jeopardy claim sua sponte. 
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In short, Petitioner failed to fairly present her double jeopardy claim to the state 
courts, waived on federal habeas any argument that she did, and states no ground to 
overcome her default.  Accordingly, she was procedurally barred from pursuing her 
double jeopardy claim on federal habeas and neither the District Court nor this Court 
should have reached the merits of that claim.   
IV. 
 As a federal court reviewing a state court conviction, we are obligated to comport 
with the principles of federalism, comity, and finality that undergird the procedural 
default bar and the exceedingly high degree of deference mandated by AEDPA.  And in 
cases where the Supreme Court has perceived Courts of Appeals to disregard this 
mandate and to substitute their own judgment for that of state courts, it has not hesitated 
to summarily reverse with harsh admonitions that the appellate court “misunderstood the 
role of a federal court in a habeas case,” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2202 (2015), 
and “all but ignored the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1),” that is, “whether 
it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that [the state court’s] arguments or 
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court, 
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
Heeding those admonitions, I would reverse the District Court’s grant of habeas 
relief in this case.   
